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Abstract
It has recently been argued by a number of writers that the
evolutionary theory of the firm is a genuine theoretical rival to the
contractual theory of the firm. This paper presents a reconstruction
of the evolutionary theory of the firm. A taxonomy developed by
the Polish philosopher Krajewski is then utilized for the purpose of
the discussing the relations between the evolutionary and the
contractual theory of the firm. It is possible to argue that the
evolutionary and the contractual theories of the firm are rivals.
However, it is also possible to argue that they have complementary
areas of research, some of which are briefly described in the paper.
(JEL:  B4, L22).
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11. Introduction
This paper is a comparative study of what are arguably the two dominant economic
approaches to the theory of the firm, namely the contractual and the evolutionary
approaches. 1 In their modern manifestations, the evolutionary and contractual
approaches to the firm begin their take-off period at almost the same time, namely at the
beginning of the 1970s ([NELSON and WINTER [1973], ALCHIAN and DEMSETZ
[1972], WILLIAMSON [1971]), but both may point to for a long time and strange reasons
neglected contributions as important precursors (COASE [1937], ALCHIAN [1950]).
Although the two streams of research have hitherto made relatively little contact,
a number of writers have recently claimed that the evolutionary approach to the firm is
beginning to look like a serious alternative to the contractual theory.2 This should be
understood in the sense that the evolutionary approach is argued to be able to address
the central explananda of the contractual approach (which are here taken to the existence,
boundaries and internal organization of the firm (cf. HOLMSTRÖM and TIROLE
[1989]))3,using an explanatory approach that is fundamentally different from that
employed in contractual theories of the firm. For example, the existence of firms is not
rationalized in terms of their ability to efficiently align the incentives of the various
                    
1 Both of these two concepts are portmanteau concepts that disguise substantial intra-category
differences, for example, in the case of the contractual approach, what is underneath this category is
really a plethora of approaches, such as Oliver Williamson’s brand of transaction cost economics
(WILLIAMSON [1985]), “nexus of contracts” theories (ALCHIAN and DEMSETZ [1972], JENSEN
and MECKLING [1976]), property rights/incomplete contract theories (GROSSMAN and HART
[1986]), and modern agency work on the firm (HOLMSTRÖM and MILGROM [1994]). In this paper, I
 suppress intra-category differences and only focus on generic features.
2 See particularly KOGUT and ZANDER [1992],  FOSS [1993], DOSI and MARENGO [1994], GHOSHAL,
MORAN and ALMEIDA-COSTA [1995], WITT [1995], CONNER and PRAHALAD [1996], and
HODGSON [1996]. It should be noted that not all of these refer to their theories as “ev olutionary”, but use
such concepts as “capabilities-based” or “resource-based”.
The evolutionary critique may be seen as part of a larger and ongoing heterodox critique of 
contractual economics. For a recent exchange between proponents of contractual economics and its
heterodox critics, see GROENEWEGEN [1996].
3  Admittedly, this is too narrow; for we are certainly also interested in other types of economic
organization. The emphasis on the firm is solely due to expository convenience.
2input-owners that take part in productive activities under certain circumstances. Rather,
it is claimed that firms exist because they are superior institutional arrangements for
accumulating specialized productive knowledge, quite independently of considerations
of opportunism, incentive-alignment and the like. It is different mechanisms that are
invoked.4
This position would indeed seem to imply that there is a relation of theoretical
rivalry between the two theories. However, as I shall argue, the relation may be much
less clear-cut than simple rivalry. For example, it is certainly possible to argue that key
insights from the two theories may be fruitfully combined (e.g., LANGLOIS and FOSS
[1996]), or one may speculate whether we cannot have a third, overarching theory that
can accomodate both the contractual and the evolutionary theory of the firm as special
cases. In fact, I shall present an approach, based on the work of the philosopher
Wladyslaw KRAJEWSKI [1977], that helps us to understand and make  systematic in a
relatively precise way the possible relations between the two theories.  Thus, the aim is
to try and construct a sort of roadmap that future research in the area may use for
orientation rather than to take a firm stand on which relation obtains between the two
theories.
A further reason for raising the issue under consideration here is that it provides
an opportunity to present the rudiments of the evolutionary theory of the firm to the
readers of this journal. Clarification and some reconstruction is necessary here, because
evolutionary work on the firm is heterogenous and scattered. In contrast, contractual
theories are more clear-cut, established, homogenous, and, at any rate, well-known to
the the readers of this journal.  I begin the paper by providing an overview and
reconstruction of the evolutionary theory of the firm (section 2) and then turn to a more
detailed discussion of the relations between the two theories (section 3).
                                                               
4  In this paper, I focus more on explanatory mechanisms than on  underlying theoretical assumptions.
Thus, I sidestep issues such as the difference between the two theories in terms of their behavioral
assumptions, the use of equilibrium methodology, etc.  Clearly, a full discussion would have to take
this into account, but space prohibits this in the present case.
32. The Evolutionary Theory of the Firm:
A Primer
A. Preliminary
The theory of the firm and evolutionary economics are themes that have historically had
a close connection. In fact, they have to a large extent co-evolved, and their mutual
impact has introduced a good deal of what we may call “intellectual path-depencence”.5
 For example, as a large revisionist literature (LOASBY [1976], MOSS [1984],
O’BRIEN [1984], METCALFE [1989]) has made clear, what we think of as
“Marshallian” theory today is in many ways less the creation of Alfred Marshall
than of some of his successors. Marshall sought to incorporate variety as a critical
dimension in his explanatory apparatus. His concept of industry equilibrium, which
combined a population of disequilibrium firms with industry level supply-demand
equilibrium, was a reflection of Marshall’s attempt to analytically approach variety, and
his concept of the representative firm was designed in order to bridge the firm level and
the industry level.  In the hands of Marshall’s successors (primarily Pigou and
Robinson), however, the representative firm was transformed into something
presumably far from Marshall’s intentions, namely into the uniform equilibrium firm of
standard price theory. This may be seen as a minor and subtle change; but according to
the revisionists cited above, it had the effect of suppressing all of that in Marshall’s
thought that had an evolutionary or developmental character. The triumph of the new
value theory over the older Marshallian approach was the decisive event that cemented
maximization, equilibrium, complete uniformity, and single-exit-modelling as the
essentials of neoclassical economics, and thus hindered the development of evolutionary
economics for a number of decades
                    
5  Of course, more broadly, economics and theoretical biology has to some extent co-evolved,
particularly in the founding periods of both disciplines.
4The evolutionary rear-guard action occurred, of course, in the context of the so-
called profit maximization controversy. 6 This involved such illustrious figures as Fritz
MACHLUP, Milton FRIEDMAN [1953], Armen ALCHIAN [1950] and Edith PENROSE
[1952].  The debate is important for two overall reasons: First, it demonstrated the
viability of a population-perspective in economics.7 For example, Alchian demonstrated
that it was possible to derive the usual qualitative results of standard price theory using
an approach in which firms are assumed to act in a very myopic and non-deliberative
way.  Second, the debate points directly towards the formal evolutionary work by
Sidney WINTER [1964, 1971, 1975], which was directly provoved by FRIEDMAN’s
[1953] arguments in profit maximization controversy,  and Winter’s somewhat later joint
work with Richard NELSON [NELSON and WINTER, 1982].
On the background of these episodes, one could perhaps entertain the
expectation that the theory of the firm must be one one of the most highly developed
subject areas within evolutionary economics. However, it is fair to say that within the
evolutionary economics of the last two  decades  the theory of the firm has not at all been
given attention on a par with the attention given to, for example, technological change.8
This has to do with the explanatory role of firms in evolutionary economics, where (to
put it briefly) firms have been part of the explanans of evolutionary economics, but not
(until recently) of the explanandum. Thus, the role of firms in most of evolutionary
economics is not fundamentally different from the role of firms in standard price theory:
They are intermediate steps in the explanatory logic,  not entities to explained
                                                               
6 It is seldom recognized that these two incidents are closely related. Thus, Nelson and Winter, their many
references to Schumpeter notwithstanding, are in reality much more Marshallian than Schumpeterian.
Their emphasis on incremental innovation and routinized firm behavior, as well as the use of an industry
equilibrium concept that features a population of heterogenous disequilibrium firms is straight out of
Principles of Economics rather than out of The Theory of Economic Development.
7  By a “population-perspective” is meant that the object of analysis is a heterogenous population of
agents (e.g., firms) which are subject to a process of selection.
8  Some confirmation of this assertion may be obtained by consulting the house journal of The
International Joseph Schumpeter Society, The Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
5themselves. It is in fact only quite recently that a distinct evolutionary theory of the firm
has been cultivated, and many of the important developments have taken place where
management studies and evolutionary economics overlap.
In order to better  appreciate what is meant by an “evolutionary” theory of the
firm, it is necessary to take a brief look at the explanatory structure, and the
methodological and metaphysical of evolutionary economics. This is not the place to
provide a detailed discussion of the evolutionary research programme, but it is
necessary to provide an outline, simply because this helps pinning down restrictions on
and desiderata to an evolutionary theory of the firm.
B. Some Elementary Evolutionary Ideas
Defining the meaning of “evolutionary economics” is a venture fraught with dangers
and uncertainties. To some extent, this is a matter of the plethora of meanings that have
been ascribed to the term (see HODGSON [1993]). But it is also a matter of almost
automatically becoming involved in a long and inconclusive debate about the validity of
using  analogies to the central mechanisms of evolutionary change (variation,
heredity/retention, selection) on the social domain. My own position with respect to this
issue is that too much energy has been invested in the search for precise analogies and
isomorphism in the mapping from biological mechanisms to social mechanisms, and
that our conventional analogies do have relatively precise and, at any rate, very useful
connotations within economics (cf. MOKYR [1991]). However, because they are likely to
mislead, I shall not use these analogies and metaphors systematically.
A (possibly idiosyncratic) synthesis of central contributions to evolutionary
economics9 produces something like the following short list of  central propositions
(their order does not necessarily reflect their importance):
1. Microfoundations are necessary.10
                    
9  I here rely on NELSON and WINTER [1982], HODGSON [1993], WITT [1992], DOSI and
MARENGO [1994], NIGHTINGALE [1994].
62. Microfoundations should be built on the related ideas that
 2A) there is an imperfect understanding of the environment ,
 2B) there is imperfect adaptation to the environment, and
 2C) there is always a possibility of discovering something new, that is, to say of 
novelty being injected into the system.
3. Aggregate phenomena (e.g., industry structure) should be explained as emergent
phenomena, using the idea that
4. There exists a mechanism, working on the level of the environment, that
4A) sorts among members of a population (or some populations over other 
populations),
4B) sorts on the basis of some criterion/criteria that connects to realized 
behaviors, and
4C)  manifests itself in, for example, differential growth rates of firms. 
Several things may be said about this list. First, it evidently connects to the three
central mechanisms of evolutionary change in biology, namely variation  (point 1 and 2),
heredity/retention (point 2) and selection (point 3 and 4). Second, although firms and
firm behavior is not a strictly necessary component of evolutionary economics (one can
have evolutionary processes in a strict exchange economy), the points dovetail rather
directly with firms. Consider, for example, point 2) in the context of the firm.
The overall idea here is that there is a gap between the competence of agents and
the difficulty of the decision problems they confront  (HEINER [1983]), in contrast to most
mainstream economics where such a gap does not exist. The implication is that agents
will normally come equipped with different frameworks and heuristics for solving
problems (a source of variation), where these frameworks are heavily shaped by past
                                                               
10  This does not emphatically not imply extreme methodological individualism, but rather the sort of
“organicism” described by HODGSON [1993].
7experience and by the limits imposed by the particular sets of heuristics in play (a source
of heredity/retention). Clearly, the relevant frameworks, experience and sets of
heuristics may be firm-specific and shared rather than specific to individuals. Much of
the contemporary discussion of “core competence”, “corporate culture”, “capabilities”
and the like reflects indeed precisely the firm-specific nature of shared mental
frameworks. An implication of this view is that agents are more than Popperian “zeros”
(POPPER [1967]). That is to say, behavior is not best analyzed as simply the application
of a rationality principle to the logic of the situation. Rather, agents come equipped with
an internal make-up consisting of decision-rules (“theories”) that may be changed, for
example, in the face of refuting instances (see LOASBY [1991]), but which typically are
relatively stable over time.
In the context of the evolutionary theory of the firm, this is accounted by
postulating that firms come equipped with, for example, “routines” (NELSON and
WINTER [1982]) or “competences” (DOSI and MARENGO [1994])11, which are thought of
as recurring and context dependent action patterns, which are selectable (e.g., by the
environment) and have some automatic quality, but may change through learning.12
Because of these features, routines will seldom be “optimal”, routines will differ among
agents, and behaviors cannot be deduced from simply observing the environmental
signals (such as prices) that agents are exposed to (NELSON and WINTER [1982]).  This
variety drives the evolutionary process, since firms articulate rent-seeking strategies on
                    
11 ALCHIAN [1950] was taken to task by Edith PENROSE [1952] for not incorporating a mechanism
of inheritance. The missing mechanism was explicitly supplied by WINTER [1964] in his
identification of firm routines as the relevant carriers of knowledge. However, implicitly Penrose
herself has identified the mechanism, namely in her 1959 conceptualization of the firm as a bundle of
accumulating and idiosyncratic knowledge resources. Thus, in spite of her harsh critique of
evolutionary explanations in economics (PENROSE [1952]), her own discussion of [differential] firm
growth and the causes of firm growth is perfectly consistent with an evolutionary explanation.
12 NELSON and WINTER [1982] construct this less stylized view by suggesting an “organizational
genetics”, where firms” hierarchically arranged routines are the relevant genotypes. Organizational
structure, degree of diversification, revealed firm performance, etc. thus correspond to the phenotype, that
is, the outward manifestation of the firm-specific knowledge  coded in routines.
8the basis of their routines and competencies, and competition in the product market
constitutes an important part of the selection environment confronting firms.
C. Firms and Evolutionary Economics
The upshot of the preceding section is that firms and firm behavior rather naturally
connects to the basic explanatory structure of evolutionary economics, and one would
therefore seem to be justified in expecting the theory of the firm to occupy a central place
in evolutionary economics. As has already been noted, this has not typically been the
case. The perhaps most important reason for this lies in the population-ecological
orientation of modern evolutionary economics. For example, Nelson and Winter’s 1982
book is primarily a story about what happens to an industry’s population of firms, not
about individual firms per se. Nelson and Winter’s two chapters [1982, chapter 4 and 5]
about firms, routines, capabilities, etc. merely function to create a foundation for
asserting a certain rigidness of firm reactions,13 and to rationalize variety in terms of unit
costs, and therefore differences in revealed competitive advantages. 
In such a story, it is not necessary to say much about the firm, for exactly the same
reason that it is not necessary to say much about the firm in neoclassical price theory. In
both cases, the firm is a step in the mental apparatus constructed for analyzing industry
level phenomena (MACHLUP [1967]). At the face of it, the role of firms in phylogenetic
economic evolution seems to be as restricted as the role of firms in traditional
neoclassical microeconomic. As NELSON [1992, 166-167] admits:
“...the treatment of firms in our models (i.e., NELSON and WINTER
[1982], NJF) and in neoclassical ones is similar in many respects. Our
interest is in what happens to variables defined at the level of an industry
                    
13  It should be noted that the evolutionary argument that firms are inert does not amount to the
proposition that firms are completely unable to change. Rather, it is a much more subtle argument that
some parts -- perhaps the crucial ones -- are much less likely to change rapidly in response to outside
changes than other parts. It is widely recognized that the resources that matter the most for firm success --
such as technological competencies, culture, reputation, etc. -- are best viewed as stock variables that can
only be gradually changed by appropriately chosen input flows (DIERICKX and COOL [1989]). 
9or economy. The only attributes that are modelled are those that bear on
these matters”.
However, there are in fact some differences between neoclassical and evolutionary
industry-level analysis with respect to how the firm is conceptualized.
 First, in contrast to neoclassical models,there cannot be any representative firms
in evolutionary models; there is just a distribution of different firms and it is meaningless
to single any of them out as “representative”.14 Second, what individual firms do matter
in models such as those in NELSON and WINTER [1982]. This is because firms are
modelled as making “draws” from a probability distribution of technical advances.
Thus, best-practice technology at any time can be seen as having been found by
particular firms, which means that fully understanding the dynamics of the Nelson and
Winter models requires a description of what particular firms did (NELSON [1992: 167]).
Third,  firms in evolutionary models, such as the Nelson and Winter models, are less
anonymous than neoclassical firms, because they come equipped with different decision-
rules, whereas neoclassical firms are only hard-wired with maximization as decision-
rule. Interestingly, it is essentially the population logic, with its emphasis on variation,
that produces a need for a less stylized view of the firm.
In fact, things are changing, since there has during the last 5-10 years emerged a
steadily growing body of work that explicitly deals with the individual firm, rather than
with the aggregate results of interaction among firms. What is noteworthy about this
work is that it, in addition to containing many new perspectives and insights, addresses
many of the same issues as the contractual approach does, such as the issue of what are
the efficient boundaries of firms.15
                    
 14 As a historical aside, it may be suggested that it was precisely the difficulties of giving meaning to
representativity within a population perspective that caused the problems that Marshall’s concept of
the representative firm met with, even among sympathetic interpreters.
15 Some examples are ELIASSON [1990], LOASBY [1991], MARENGO [1992], KOGUT and ZANDER
[1992], LANGLOIS [1992], FOSS [1993], DOSI, TEECE, WINTER and RUMELT [1994], WITT [1995],
HODGSON [1996], LANGLOIS AND FOSS [1996]. One is also comforted by the observation that the
theorists more responsible than anyone else for turning the attention of modern economists towards
10
D. The Individual Firm in Recent Evolutionary Economics
NELSON and WINTER [1982] devote two chapters (4 and 5) to developing the notion of
routines as parts of a wider theory of organizational knowledge; an analysis that is
firmly grounded in behavioralist organization theory, but adds to this an elaborate
analysis of the notion of tacitness as it connects to organizational knowledge. According
to Nelson and Winter, routines code organizational knowledge, and are history-bound,
socially produced and reproduced, and rigid. Their presence introduces path-
dependence and inflexibility on the cost side, while introducing specialization
advantages and coherence on the benefit side. The conceptualization of the firm that
emerges from Nelson and Winter’s two chapters is one of a body of idiosyncratic and
productive knowledge which is implemented in productive tasks through existing routines. It is
this conceptualization that is the starting point for recent developments in the
evolutionary theory of the firm.  Evolutionary economists argue that this
conceptualization helps us address issues that are only inadequately addressed by
contractual theories of the firm. Grand Questions in this regard are, Why do firms differ?
How does it matter? And how should it be theoretically approached (cf. NELSON
[1991]). More specifically, we may ask empirically motivated questions (cf. DOSI and
MARENGO [1994]), such as
• Why do we observe such a wide dispersion of returns among firms, even
within the same industry (cf. RUMELT [1984])?
• Why is this dispersion seemingly persistent? [ibid.].
• Why do firms exhibit different rates of growth?
                                                               
evolutionary economics and for reforming evolutionary economics, Richard Nelson and Sidney
Winter, are both increasingly directing their interests toward the firm (rather than the industry level)
(e.g., NELSON [1991],  WINTER [1993]).
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• Why do firms, even within the same industry, have different
boundaries, strategies, organizational structures, etc.?
It is not clear that the contractual approach help us explaining all of these questions, or
even any of them.16 The reason? They would seem to hinge on variety, dynamics,
differing endowments of productive (knowledge) resources, etc. - that is to say, issues
that have hitherto received relatively little treatment in the context of non-evolutionary
theories of the firm (standard neoclassical, industrial organization, contractual).  To the
extent that  differences among firms are admitted in these theories, they are rationalized
by pointing to some initial -- and therefore essentially unexplained -- differences in
endowments (including information), and barriers to imitation (i.e., prohibitive costs of
information, patent rights, etc.) sustain these differences. Thus one can have an
equilibrium with firms of different efficiency, yielding different returns (which are then
interpreted as rents) (LIPPMAN and RUMELT [1982]). This is an nteresting line of
research, but it does not capture all, or even the most important aspects, of sustained
inter-firm differences. Rather, theoretical answers may turn on the essentially
evolutionary notions of firms as knowledge-bearing, learning, and novelty creating
entities, that is to say, on a notion of the firm as endogenously creating its productive
opportunity set (PENROSE [1959, 1]).
The point here is that in order to satisfactorily address the above issues (and, no
doubt, also many other issues), we really need a fine-grained analysis of the individual
firm, one that explicitly makes room for issues relating to the production and
exploitation of productive knowledge. Evolutionary theories that are explicitly
concerned with analyzing the individual firm (rather than firm populations, industries
or the economy) in these terms are sometimes called “ontogenetic” theories. By this is
                    
16  It is possible, of course, to invoke different ways of handling  transaction cost problems as an
explanation of, for example, differences in returns (see WILLIAMSON [1994]). However, it strains
redulity to argue that this explains all observable variations in returns.
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meant that they are concerned with the evolution of the individual “organism”; for
example, they inquire into the “unfolding process” (PENROSE [1959, 1]) of firm growth.
17 Such theories better allows us to understand why firms differ and gives an improved
basis for discussing how such differences matter (cf. NELSON [1991]). That is, we are
more detailed and explicit about a necessary element in the overall evolutionary
explanation.18
E. Streams of Research
With respect to recent evolutionary work on the individual firm, a number of partly
overlapping streams of research can be identified, of which I here provide a small
conspectus.
The overall conceptualisation of the firm that underlies much evolutionary
work on the was perhaps best stated by the late Edith Penrose in her The Theory of the
Growth of the Firm (1959) and explicitly differentiated by her from the prevailing
production function view. “The firm”, Penrose says, “is...a collection of productive
resources the disposal of which between different uses and over time is determined
by administrative decision” (PENROSE [1959,  24]). Resources in Penrose’s view
yield services, and it is these services that interest her the most. Because
resources/services become specialised to firms - and mesh with each other in a
                    
17 There has traditionally been a rather sharp diversion between ontogenetically oriented approaches to the
firm in which the firm is factored in its own right, and phylogenetic theories in which firms are factored
because they embody mechanisms of heredity, variety and variety-creation but where the analytical
attention is towards the industry-level. Of course, the difference in terms of the anonymity with which
firms are described is to a large extent a matter of the difference in terms of level of analysis. Sometimes,
however, one also see the distinction phrased a matter of a deep and clear-cut difference between the
study of the adoption on the part of economic system or the study of individual adaptation (see
PENROSE’S [1952] of ALCHIAN [1950]). However, the distinction between economics as either the study
of systemic adoption or the study of individual adaptation is a false one. Selection is perfectly consistent
with intentionality and rationality, with carefully chosen strategies and with adaptation  - if not with
perfect adaptation (see HODGSON [1993: chapter 14]). What matters in terms of the working of the basic
evolutionary mechanisms is differential firm growth.
18 This is not necessarily to say that the fundamental evolutionary mechanisms are inapplicable to the
organizational level. On the contrary, Herbert SIMON [1962] long ago explicitly tied organization-level
learning dynamics to evolutionary theory by arguing that processes of search and discovery can be
conceptualized in terms of variety and selection. Thus, it is not necessarily sloppy terminology to say of a
firm that it is “evolving” rather than “developing”.
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team-like manner -  they are worth more to the firm than to the market (meaning
other firms). They therefore yield quasi-rents, part of which may be appropriated by
the firm’s owners. Moreover, although resources/services are firm-specific, they are
nevertheless “fungible” inside the firm, and, when in excess, they are stepping-
stones for diversifying to new markets. Penrose’s work helped define at least three
distinct areas of research that all relate to or are part of contemporary  evolutionary
work on the firm.
The first one partially stems from her emphasis that specialised, scarce and
valuable resources/services yield rents; this has helped founding what is today
referred to as “the resource-based perspective” in contemporary firm strategy
research (WERNERFELT [1984], FOSS [1997]). The main research focus here
concentrates on clarifying what must obtain for resources to yield long-lived rents
(that is, give rise to sustained competitive advantage). The other area of research is
diversification studies (e.g., DOSI, TEECE, and WINTER [1992]) where the Penrosian
theory based on hard-to-trade resources in excess is perhaps the dominant economic
theory of diversification. 
The third area of research that Penrose’s work helped to establish is
organisational behaviour and learning studies which also owe a heavy debt to
seminal contributions to organisation theory such CYERT and MARCH [1963].
Penrose argued that the management team holds images of the external environment and
of the firm’s internal resources, that these images are produced through internal learning
processes, and that they determine “the productive opportunity set” of the firm, that is,
what the firm can see and take advantage of.
Such ideas have been revived in recent evolutionary work on firm learning
which has taken its cues not only from Penrose, but also, and perhaps even more from
the Nelson and Winter treatment of organizations, making more explicit the
behavioralist components of that analysis.  Important contributions within this stream of
research have been made by James MARCH [1991], Luigi MARENGO [1992], and
                                                               
14
Massimo WARGLIEN [1995], among others. This approach is explicitly process oriented
(because of the emphasis on learning), and in its most recent manifestations it is much
given to the method of computer simulation.
A key idea in this approach is that knowledge is not only dispersed (or
distributed) in markets (cf. HAYEK [1945]); a considerable dispersion of knowledge also
characterizes at least large firms. In fact, management in very large firms confront a
knowledge dispersion problem on a par with the problem that confronts a would-be
social planner (see GHOSHAL, MORAN and ALMEIDA-COSTA [1995]). Therefore, a
main organizational problem confronting firms is to create a shared knowledge-base that
will ease efficient coordination, for example, between functions or divisions, to take
place. It is a matter of making sure that agents interpret various events in the same way.
Concepts such as “routines” and “corporate culture” are, of course, representatives of
such shared knowledge bases that have received considerable theoretical attention, but
what is new in the emerging evolutionary organizational learning literature is that the
process of emergence of such shared knowledge-bases is actually modelled.
A study by Luigi MARENGO [1992] exemplifies this approach. Taking his cues
from CYERT and MARCH [1963], Marengo is particularly interested in the coordination
of individual learning processes inside the firm, and how a stock of  organizational
knowledge emerges from the interaction of these learning processes. In his simulation
model, agents do not have any prior knowledge of the environment they are facing and
they do not possess a shared partition of the states of the world (that is, there is no
common knowledge).
However, such a shared partition is necessary for coordination - for example,
understanding the demand of the exogenous market and coordinating this with the
different shops inside the firm - to take place. And, in fact, as demonstrated by
Marengo’s simulations, coordination emerges gradually and spontaneously, as agents
interact under given organizational structures and under the impact of given
environments. Thus, spontaneous order may arise within the planned order of the firm
(to borrow HAYEK’S [1973] terminology), as it were.
15
This is an important contribution towards better understanding the more
“emergent” aspects of the internal organizations of firms, something about which
contemporary contractual theory is almost entirely silent. Moreover, it goes a long way
in accounting for the ultimate sources of firm heterogeneity: Because of the role of
random influences and the path-dependent nature of collective learning processes, these
are particularly likely to be the key causal forces behind the emergence of essential
variation among firms.
The other dominant evolutionary approach to the firm is the capabilities approach.
Whereas the organizational learning approach is directly associated with organization
studies, the capabilities approach has had a leaning towards the firm strategy field (e.g.,
RUMELT [1984], WERNERFELT [1984], FOSS [1997]). This is not surprising, since there
is a close connection between the various properties of capabilities and their ability to
generate and sustain a rent-yielding capacity when deployed to a product market. For
example, partial tacitness makes it costly to imitate capabilities. Moreover, capabilities
contain essentially distributed knowledge, that is to say, knowledge that is only
mobilized in the context of carrying out a multi-person productive task; is not
possessed by any single agent, and normally requires some sort of qualitative
coordination, for example, through direction and command, for its efficient use.19 
Indeed, capabilities are precisely characterized by these features: they may seen as
team-embodied and partly tacit production and organization knowledge that can be
operated by team-members for a strategic purpose. 
One may conclude from this brief presentation that the organizational learning
and the capabilities approach are complementary: the one investigating learning process,
the other one investigating the properties of the products of these processes. However, it
is arguably somewhat misleading to make a sharp distinction between the process and
the content of learning, a point repeatedly emphasized in NELSON and WINTER’S
                    
19 Of course, not all distributed knowledge requires conscious direction for its efficient utilization; in
fact, it is a standard argument in favor of the market order that it better utilizes distributed
knowledge than any known directed order (HAYEK [1945]).
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[1982] critique of traditional choice theory.  And in the end both perspectives
conceptualize firms essentially as problem-solvers (LOASBY [1976, 1991], DOSI and
MARENGO [1993]), where the problems to be solved may include, but certainly are not
restricted to, finding organizational forms that economize with transaction costs.
To sum up on this section, the overall evolutionary understanding of the firm is
that it is a body of largely tacit, local and distributed production knowledge where this
knowledge is coordinated by shared knowledge and understandings and by
administrative fiat, and grows through application to productive task. Thus, to a large
extent the firm is seen as a cognitive entity.
F. The Evolutionary Theory as a Theory of Economic Organization
17
An important implication of the epistemic assumptions of evolutionary theory is that
coordination problems will, prima facie, loom larger in evolutionary economics than in
standard neoclassical economics and arguably also loom larger than in the contractual
approach to the firm.  This may have important implications for the theory of the firm.
For example, it implies that firms may find a rationale in their ability to supply some
shared knowledge base to some subset of the economy’s input-owners (KOGUT and
ZANDER [1992],  GHOSHAL, MORAN and ALMEIDA-COSTA [1995], WITT [1995]). 
And it also implies that the pure coordination aspects of firm organization should not be
sacrificed at the expense of incentive-alignment issues.
As LANGLOIS and FOSS [1996] point out, there are in fact two principal
theoretical avenues easily closed off by a conception of the firm as merely the
solution to a problem of incentive alignment. One is the possibility that knowledge
about how to produce and organization is imperfect, dispersed, bounded, sticky and
idiosyncratic.  The second is the possibility that knowledge about how to link
together one person’s (or firm’s) productive knowledge with that of another is also
imperfect. The first possibility leads us to the issue of capabilities; the second leads
to the issue of qualitative coordination. Both issues are central in recent attempts to
construct an independent evolutionary approach to economic organization.20
For example, KOGUT and ZANDER [1992], LANGLOIS [1992], FOSS [1993] and
LANGLOIS and ROBERTSON [1995] argue that problems of economic organization
may reflect the possibility that a firm controls production knowledge that is, in
important dimensions, strongly different from what others control.21  Thus members of
one firm may quite literally not understand what another firm wants from them (for
example, in supplier contracts) or is offering them (for example, in license contracts). In
                    
20  These attempts thus confirm the conjecture of contractual theorists, Paul MILGROM and John
ROBERTS [1988] that “The incentive based transaction cost theory has been made to carry too much of the
weight of explanation in the theory of organizations. We expect competing and complementary theories to
emerge  - theories that are founded on economizing on bounded rationality and that pay more attention to
changing technology and to evolutionary considerations” [p.450].
21  In the terminology of George RICHARDSON [1972], their capabilities are highly “dissimilar”.
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this setting, the costs of making contacts with potential partners, of educating potential
licensees and franchisees, of teaching suppliers what it is one needs from them, etc.,
become very real factors determining where the boundaries of firms will be placed.
Note that these “dynamic transaction costs” (LANGLOIS [1992]) are in a different
category from the transaction costs usually considered in the contractual theory of the
firm.  Transacting difficulties are not a matter of incentive problems within an otherwise
well-defined and well-understood exchange context. The basic story has nothing to do
per se with misaligned incentives in already established relations, but rather centers
around the more basic coordination problem of getting everybody on the same wawe-
length, as it were. Similarly, the work of MARENGO [1992] does not directly appeal to
misaligned incentives, but instead highlights other types of coordination problems -
namely the coordination of knowledge, learning and expectations - as more basic for an
understanding of internal organization.
3. Evolutionary and Contractual Theories of the Firm:
Towards an Understanding of their Relations
Debate on the respective roles and merits of different theories of the firm is certainly not
new to economics. Almost three decades ago, Fritz MACHLUP [1967] and Brian
LOASBY [1971] in two classic contributions assessed contemporary debate within the
theory of the firm, specifically the behavioralist critique of the neoclassical theory of the
firm. Both concluded that the behavioralist theory of the firm was not a rival to the
neoclassical theory of the firm, since they had different domains of application. The
behavioralist theory of the firm that Machlup and Loasby discussed was then
unconnected to evolutionary economics (except for WINTER [1964]), but today the
connection has been made explicit by a number of evolutionary theorists in an
expanding literature (e.g., NELSON and WINTER [1982], LOASBY [1991], MARENGO
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[1992]). It would therefore seem natural to discuss whether we today have an
evolutionary theory of the firm that is competitive relative to neoclassical theories of the
firm  or whether we  reach a conclusion  similar to Machlup and Loasby’s.
A. Relations Between Theories: General Considerations
In the preceding pages, the importance to evolutionary theories of the firm of concepts
such as learning, routines and capabilities has been noted. These concepts would seem to
play an organizing role similar to the role that “contracts, incentives, transaction costs,
etc.” play in contractual theories of the firm. However,  they evidently refer to quite
different phenomena. A further consideration may be that evolutionary theories of the
firm do not at all live up to the standards of rigour that characterize contemporary
contractual theories of the firm (see TIROLE [1994]).
However, this is arguably an unfair observation, since it involves treating one
body of thought in terms of the criteria with which another body of thought is evaluated.
A more fruitful approach and one that will be followed here is to “...compare the
abstractions and the methods of analysis which are legitimised by each, the kinds of
answers which each can give,  and the questions which each permits to be asked”
(LOASBY [1971, 882]). On these four criteria the two bodies of theories would at first
glance seem to be miles apart, perhaps even incommensurable, in the (weak) sense of
having different domains of application.22 But the relation may be more complex. In
order to make more systematic the inquiry into the relation between these two theories, I
make use of twenty years old work by the Polish philosopher Wlasyslaw KRAJEWSKI
[1977]. He suggested a useful terminology for classifying relations between alternative
theories. The taxonomy in table 1 reflects this terminology.  Specifally, it maps possible
relations between two theories, T1 and T2, in terms of their domain of application (D)
(explanandum) and their “theoretical language” (V) (explanans).
                    
 22 KUHN [1970] packs much more radical implications into his concept of incommensurability. For
an application of Kuhn’s ideas to the theory of the firm, see LOASBY [1971].
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XXXXXXXX Insert Table 1 about here XXXXXXXX
Krajewski’s taxonomic apparatus was primarily constructed with reference to
physics. However, I hope to demonstrate that it may also prove useful in the context of
economics, specifically in the context of comparing evolutionary and contractual theories
of the firm. The right place to start is to inquire into whether our two theories are
commensurable in the sense that they have overlapping domains of application.
B. Domains of Application
At first glance, one is led to think of evolutionary and contractual theories as having non-
overlapping domains of application, simply because the main thrust of the theories is so
different: Whereas contractual theories are concerned with the efficient organization of
transactions in terms of the incentive-alignment properties of alternative governance
structures, evolutionary theories are concerned with a complete different set of
explananda, namely the production and utilization of knowledge. However, as the
preceding sections have clarified we now have a growing, if heterogeneous, collection of
evolutionary models and theories of firms’ market behavior, of their internal
organization, of their boundaries and of their role as repositories of knowledge.  In fact,
as is conveyed by table 2, it turns out that evolutionary and contractual theories of the
firm in fact share overlapping domains.
XXXXXXXX Insert Table 2 about here XXXXXXXX
Thus, if one brings into play the whole corpus of evolutionary theories of the
firm, it would seem to turn out these theories have the same objects of explanation as
modern contractual theories. They are therefore commensurable in the narrow sense in
which the term is used here.Moreover, evolutionary theories adds something, namely
the role of firms as repositories of knowledge (this role is not treated in contractual
theories). Therefore, the domain of application of contractual theories is therefore, strictly
speaking, a subset of that of evolutionary theories. Finally, the theories would indeed
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appear to make use of different theoretical languages, and it does not seem possible to
translate the theoretical language of contractual theories (incentives, property rights,
transaction costs, contracts) to the language of evolutionary theories of the firm 
(discovery, utilization and accumulation of knowledge).23 As a result, the relation
between the two theories cannot be one of equivalence.
This leaves us with a number of other possibilities. For example, are they
competitive and perhaps in contradiction to each other; or, is it possible to establish some
sort of correspondence between them; or, is it perhaps even possible to show to reduce one
of the theories to the other one? These possibilities are discussed in the following
sections.
C. The Competitive Relation
So far we have concluded that there is a substantial sharing of domain between the two
theories, and that they use different explanatory apparatuses and different concepts.
These may even be in conflict. For example, the central evolutionary concept of novelty
may conflict with the contractual idea of minimizing transaction costs: It may be
misleading to portray transaction costs as something to be minimized on an ex ante
basis, simply because the extent and seriousness of the knowledge problems which
transaction costs are expressions of may not be know until they have occured.  For these
and other reasons, it would seem to be a rather natural conclusion that the theories in
question are competitive. Now, commensurable and non-identical theories may be
competitive in at least two different ways:
• 1) They may be competitive in the sense that they claim different
degrees of relevance for their objects of explanation.24
                    
 23 That is, there is no one-to-one relation between the “languages”, V1 «V2. This means that it is not
possible to translate T1 to T2, and vice versa, T1 = L1 [T2] and T2 = L2 [T1]. For example, the concepts of
opportunism and morally hazardous behavior more generally are not normally employed in
evolutionary theories of the firm and cannot be translated into the explanatory language used in
these theories.
24 I owe this point to Ulrich Witt.
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• 2) They may be competitive in the sense that they address the same
object of explanation (D1=D2) and the hypotheses that underlie the
relevant alternative theories have some implications where they are in
opposition (T1Þ ØT2, T2 ÞØT1), and where it is, therefore, possible to
discriminate between them.
With respect to 1), it has in fact been asserted that, while transaction cost considerations
are not unimportant per se, they are nevertheless practically subordinate to more long-
run considerations of knowledge-accumulation and creation  (e.g., LOASBY [1991]).
Innovation, the creation of markets, learning within and between firms and other
evolutionary pet-themes are either side-stepped or implicitly taken to be unimportant to
economic organization in the contractual theory of the firm. As a result, and if one
believes this characterization to be true, the evolutionary theory of the firm is inherently
more relevant than the contractual theory of the firm, at least in the sense in which
longer term strategic issues are more important or relevant than short-term operational
issues. 
With respect to point 2), table 2 indicates the presence of a substantial amount of
domain-sharing. But the underlying theoretical langauges are widely different; for
example, evolutionary work on the firm typically play down the incentive alignment
considerations that are central in the contractual theory. Moreover, the theories have
different and rival implications for a number of phenomena. For example, Williamson
rather explicitly argues that transaction cost minimization is the relevant criterion of
survival (see WILLIAMSON [1994]).  There is little reason to doubt that transaction cost
properties is a trait of important selective significance, and that this to a large extent can
be traced back to underlying incentives and property rigths. However,  the evolutionary
perspective is that even though particular constellations of incentives  and property
rights (HOLMSTRÖM and MILGROM [1994]) is an aspect of the firm, the firm is also a
structure of hierarchical and nested information flows, and a structure of productive
knowledge, residing in competencies. Moreover, the kind of organizational theory that
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has traditionally influenced evolutionary economics emphasizes the political nature of
the firm (e.g., CYERT and MARCH [1963]).
In an evolutionary perspective, these “traits” of the firm - that is, incentives,
capabilities, the distribution of power - may all have some selective significance.
Moreover, they may interact in various way - producing “epistatic effects”
(KAUFFMAN [1993]) - and this interaction may in itself have fitness implications.25 This
indicates the possibility that not all of the organization’s traits are necessarily equally
conducive to long term survival. For example, a firm with very strong transaction cost
properties may have inferior properties in terms of learning competencies (and vice
versa26). Thus, there is no guarantee of a perfect alignment between the various traits, that
is, aspects of the firm.
The upshot of all this is that it would indeed seem reasonable to claim a
competitive relation to exist between contractual and evolutionary theories of the firm.
Because they are so different, the two theories may continue to develop more or less
along their own tracks.  However, it is a rather general recognition that one way in
which science may make progress is by it being demonstrated that seemingly opposed
theories are in reality closer to each other than was immediately apparent (LAUDAN 
[1977]). Such a demonstration may be accomplished in many ways. For example, it may
be demonstrated that one of the theories under consideration can be reduced to the other
theory. Or, one may build a more general theory that incorporates the seemingly rival
theories as special cases. Etc. Some of these possibilities are further treated in the
following section.
D. Relations of Reduction and Correspondence
                    
25 Perhaps rather counter-intuitive ones.  For example, there is no apriori guarantee that, say, two fit
traits create a fitter combination, or that the combination of relatively unfit traits necessarily
produces an unfit combination.
26 In fact, much can be said in favor of the (old) view that there is a trade-off between the provision of
incentives and learning. For example, while diversity of behaviors and preferences leads to agency
problems, diversity also fosters learning (cf. LOASBY [1991]). For a splendid treatment of the related
trade-off between "exploitation" and "exploration", see MARCH [1991].
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An alternative to claiming a competitive relation to exist between two theories is to claim
that one of the theories may be reduced to the other theory. Two general types of
reduction may be distinguished (see table 1). The first, the homogenous reduction,
obtains when theory T1 may be shown to be a special case of a more general theory T2 (so
that D1 Ì D2), and where there is strong isomorphism between the explanatory
apparatuses employed between the two theories (in fact, V1 Ì  V2).27
In the other type of reduction, the heterogeneous reduction, there is no direct
isomorphism between the explanatory apparatuses. Additional translation is necessary.
An example may be the relation between a macro theory and a micro theory, where we
not only need supplementary hypotheses (the A in table 1) relating to, for example,
parameter values, but also need principles of composition  (the S in table 1), for example,
that macro relations are obtained via simple aggregation.
It will probably be agreed that the relation between evolutionary and contractual
theories is not one of reduction, not even of heterogeneous reduction. Thus, the
evolutionary theory of the firm (at least as this exists now) is not simply a more general
theory that encompasses the contractual theory as a special case. The problem, of course,
is that contractual and evolutionary theories may have conflicting implications for
certain domains of application. For example, the argument that opportunism play a key
role in explaining economic organization conflicts with the argument of many
evolutionary writers on the firm that capabilities are the prime determinants (and vice
versa). 
It would therefore seem to make more sense to examine those relations between
theories in which a theory is more general than another comparable theory, but also
implies a correction of the other theory. In a homogenous relation of correspondence, the two
theories apply basically isomorphous explanatory apparatuses, and T1 is an adequate
                    
27 However, in order to demonstrate that T1 is actually a special case of T2, one needs supplementary
hypotheses, T2 Ù A ® T1. An example is the representation of Keynesian economics in the
neoclassical synthesis, where Keynesian results are produced by introducing a rigid money wage into
an otherwise classical model.
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approximation to T2 within D1, while the more general theory T2 corrects T1 in D2 - D1 by
taking into account new parameters, mechanisms, etc.28 Again, this relation cannot be
claimed to obtain because the lack of isomorphism between the explanatory apparatuses
of the two theories.
In the heterogenous relation of correspondence, different explanatory apparatuses are
employed, so that translation is necessary. WINTER [1971] argued that this is the sort of
relation that obtains between a neoclassical approach to market phenomena and an
evolutionary is essentially one of heterogeneous correspondence. This is because 1)
standard neoclassical price theory may be obtained as a special case of evolutionary
analysis, 2) evolutionary analysis adds something (e.g., analysis of technological change
as a normal part of the market process), 3) implies some corrections in relation to the
basic neoclassical story (e.g., with respect to factor substitution), and 4) applies a
different explanatory apparatus.  Per implication, may the same relation exist between
the contractual (and largely neoclassical) theory of the firm and the evolutionary theory?
It seems reasonable to venture a qualified “yes” and we have in fact some recent
theorizing in which contractual insights are presented as special cases in a broader
evolutionary story. An example is LANGLOIS and ROBERTSON [1995]. They argue that
in the emerging phases of technologies and markets, economic organization is primarily
turns on differential capabilities, whereas a more stable industrial landscape allows
economic organization to hinge more on standard contractual factors, such as
opportunism. The overall perspective, however, remains evolutionary.
In spite of such integrative attempts, it is still the case that there are many and
deep-seated differences between the explanatory apparatuses that are employed by our
two theories. However, some of these differences may do more to differentiate the
approaches from each other than other differences.  For example, it may be argued that
the fact that many evolutionary theories of the firm do not make substantial use of
incentive-alignment arguments is a relatively unimportant difference, since these
                    
28 An example is the relation between the Hicks/Allen theory of consumption behavior and
Lancaster’s theory of consumption behavior.
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arguments can be integrated with the knowledge accumulation and utilization
arguments that are central in the evolutionary theory. This indicates that there may exist
a more “pragmatic” relation between the theories than those that have been considered
in the preceding pages. Specifically, there may be areas where the theories under
consideration here complement each other in the sense that one of the theories is made
richer by including some insights and propositions of the other theory. For lack of a
better word, this is here referred to as a “relation of complementarity”. 
E. Identifying and Utilizing Complementarities
The aim of this section is to provide a small conspectus of  areas where evolutionary and
contractual insights make contact.  Some of these are obvious and/or has already been
discussed in the literature, and will not be dealt with here.29 The discussion is very
intuitive and pragmatic and, somewhat in contrast to the preceding sections, aims at
carving out a few areas of possible future research.
Explanatory considerations: As has been made clear from a well-known debate
on explanation in the social sciences, it is possible to associate at least two, quite different,
meanings with “a theory of phenomenon X”. One of these, the genetic approach, accounts
for the existence of X - such as a firm - in terms of its history of emergence. The other
approach, the teleological (functionalist or intentionalist) approach, accounts for the
existence of a firm in terms of its good consequences for the involved actors. However,
usually a social phenomenon can only be fully comprehended if its history of emergence
is included in the explanation. Otherwise, the “explanation” will easily degenerate to
mere description of the thing to be explained, the explanandum. For example, we are
only fully able to understand a given firm’s pattern of diversification by incorporating its
prior development of capabilities in the explanatory apparatus (PENROSE [1959]). As
WINTER [1993] argues, transaction costs at a given point of time only explains a part of
why a firm looks like it does at that point of time; historical considerations, including
                    
29 For example, that capabilities are specific assets in the sense of WILLIAMSON [1985]. For an analysis
along these lines, see WINTER [1993].
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considerations of path-dependency and localized learning, need to also enter the
explanation.  The upshot is that the contractual theory as a basically teleological theory
“needs” genetic explanation for this reason. In economics, that sort of explanation is
supplied by evolutionary economists.
Change - particularly unexpected change:  Contractual theories of the firm, such
as, for example, WILLIAMSON [1985], use concepts - complexity, uncertainty,
incomplete contracts, asymmetric information - the meaning of which is only fully
comprehensible on the background of an economic reality characterized by change. In
other words, change is implicitly seen as necessary to make sense out of these theories. In
fact, we have it from Hayek that “It is...worth stressing that economic problems arise
always and only in consequence of change” [1945, 82]. And we have it from COASE
[1937] (paraphrasing Knight) that the firm would not arise in the absence of
“uncertainty”, and that one aspect of the efficiency of the firm has to do with its flexibility
in adjusting to certain kinds of unanticipated change. However, clearly not all kinds of
change may be relevant to economic organization.  For example, an important
distinction relates to whether we allow for unanticipated contingencies or not.
As Coase observed, interesting contracts were not only long in duration but also
open-ended, because it is usually too costly or epistemically impossible to specify all
future contingencies. This is a theme that has been increasingly addressed by a number
of contributors to the theory of the contracts and the firm (e.g., WILLIAMSON [1985],
GROSSMAN and HART [1986], KREPS [1992], TIROLE [1994]). As these writers make
clear, some notion of unforeseen contingencies, as embodied in the notion of an
incomplete contract, is necessary to tell a convincing story about why there should be
firms. In the formal manifestations of this idea, however, agents are typically portrayed
as so clever that they are able to design ex ante contracts that can efficiently handle
unanticipated future change, so that later revisions of contracts are not necessary. This is
obviously somewhat problematic, and there is in fact a debate on precisely this issue (see
TIROLE [1994] for a survey).
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However, it is hard to reject the broader argument that unpredictability  “...is a
kind of relevant knowledge which rational agents should use...For if we expect the
unexpected, we can do something to prepare for it” (LOASBY [1991, 3]).  For example,
we can hold reserves of various kinds, or we can decide to transact within a framework
of incomplete contracts.
One aspect of the evolutionary view of the firm is that the firm is an institution
for solving particular sorts of productive problems (e.g., LOASBY [1991]). Problem-
solving is an activity with distinctly hierarchical and complementary features.  Thus, one
solves problems by dividing problems into sub-problems, solving these sub-problems,
checking whether the solved sub-problems imply a solution to the overall problem,
performing further solution of the sub-problems if they do not fit into an overall
solution, etc.  This process of decomposing problems and solving sub-problems is clearly
a  trial and error process. Hierarchical coordination - at least in an evolving environment
and in large firms - is very much characterized by such features. It is therefore
essentially a learning process, rather than a matter of simply issuing the right commands
and underscoring these by the right incentives and the right doses of monitoring.  In this
perspective, a structure of incomplete contracts is necessary for intra-firm coordination.
Explananda requiring both theories:  A pragmatic argument in favor of the
complementarity interpretation is that there are certain explananda that would seem to
require the incorporation of both insights of the evolutionary and the contractual
approaches. An example concerns the organization of the innovative process. In order to
fully understand this
A specific example of research that recognizes the need for integrating evolutionary and
contractual consideration is the work of David TEECE [1982, 1986], who has combined
insights from contractual and evolutionary economics in his attempt to address efficient
diversification [1982] and the innovation boundaries of the firm [1986]. Much more
ambitiously, Douglass NORTH [1990] has combined insights from contractual
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economics with insights from evolutionary economics in his attempt to seek an
institutional answer to the causes of the wealth of nations.
 A more general theory? 
4. Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to undertake a sort of “reconstruction” of the
contemporary evolutionary theory of the firm and to compare it with the contractual
theory.  It emerged from this discussion, that it is possible to claim that the evolutionary
and contractual theories of the firm are (now) theoretical rivals: they address the same
explananda with different explanantia and have different implications for these
explananda.  Thus, what speaks in favor of the interpretation that stresses the rivalrous
nature between the two approaches simply is that the evolutionary theory of the firm is
on the verge to become a fully-fledged, independent approach to economic organization.
What is lacking, however, is the formal rigor and relative agreement on “first principles”
that characterize contemporary contractual research (cf. TIROLE [1994]).
However, other interpretations can also be defended. For example, I have
loosely indicated that there may be relations of complementarity, in which key ideas of
the contractual approach are brought to bear on key considerations in the evolutionary
perspective and vice versa.  A pragmatic argument here is that there are explananda that
would seem to require insights from both approaches for their satisfactory explanation. 
I have tried to refrain from too explicitly taken a side on which interpretation is
“the right one”. My aim has rather been to identify some of the possible (and plausible)
relations between the two dominant theories of the firm, and to clarify positions and
interpretations, so that a somewhat clearer roadmap for future research in economic
organization may emerge.
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Table 1
A taxonomy of relations between theories30
___________________________________________
Type Domain Theoretical Relation
language
Commensura- D1 Ç D2  ¹ Ø
bility
Equivalence D1 = D2 V1  «V2 T1 = L1 (T2)
T2 = L2 (T1)
Reduction:
- Homogenous D1  Ì D2 V1  Ì V2 T2  Ù A Þ T1
- Heterogenous D1  Ì D2 V1  ®V2 T2  Ù A Ù S  ÞT1
Contradic- D1 = D2 V1  ¹V2 T1 Þ ØT2
tion T2 Þ Ø T1
Correspondence:
- Homogenous D1 Ì D2 V1 = V2 T2 Þ a T1 in D1
T2 ÞØ a T1 in D2 - D1
- Heterogenous D1 Ì D2 V1  ®V2 Same as above 
                    
30 Reproduced from KRAJEWSKI [1977: 67] with slight modifications. The notation is standard set
notation; however, some of the expressions used deserve explanation. “«” means that there is a one
one to one correspondence (so that double translation between two theories is possible; “L”is a
translation operator; “®” is used to indicate a one-sided correspondence (so that double translation
is not possible); “Þ” refer to implications of a theory (e.g., “T1     Þ ØT2 ) means that the negation of
T2 follows from T1); “A” refers to supplementary hypotheses; “S” are bridging principles (as
explained in the text); and “a” means “approximates”.
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Table 2:
Domains of application of evolutionary
and contractual theories of the firm
Domain of application Evolutionary theories of the
firm
Contractual theories of the
firm
Internal organization E.g., MARENGO [1992]:
Spontaneous emergence
of coordinating, shared
knowledge
E.g., principal-agent
theory: Optimal
incentive schemes
Existence and boundaries LANGLOIS [1992],
KOGUT and ZANDER
[1992], FOSS [1993],
TEECE et al. [1994]: The
firm is a response to
non-incentive related
coordination and
communication
problems.
Transaction cost theory,
e.g., WILLIAMSON
[1985] and incomplete
contract theory, e.g.,
GROSSMAN and HART
[1985]: The firm is a
particular distribution of
property rights over
physical assets.
Knowledge-accumulation
and strategy
PENROSE [1959],
NELSON and WINTER
[1982], MONTGOMERY
[1995]: The firm is a
cluster of knowledge
assets, and articulates its
strategy on this basis
Knowledge-
accumulation not
treated. Strategy only
deals with product
markets (New IO).
Strategy is a matter of
tactical ploys.
Industry-level analysis E.g., NELSON and
WINTER [1982]. The
firm is a relatively
anonymous bundle of
routines (“phylogenetic
theories of the firm”).
Standard price theory:
The firm is an
anonymous production
function.
